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Note
Accuracy or Efficiency: Has Grain Processing
Made a Difference?
George David Kidd*
Since the Federal Circuit’s adoption of Panduit’s causation
standard1 for establishing entitlement to lost profits damages
in patent litigation, application of its noninfringing alternatives
prong has lacked consistency.2 The court’s decision in Grain
Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., however,
created an additional contribution to the Panduit standard,
thereby raising the evidentiary bar while significantly altering
the noninfringing-alternative inquiry.3 Grain Processing has
given the infringer a potentially powerful defensive mechanism
in an area in which patentees are generally favored,4 even
© 2014 George David Kidd
* JD Candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to thank Professor Thomas F. Cotter for his review, insightful
feedback, and editing; the editors and staff members of the Minnesota Journal
of Law, Science & Technology for their hard work in revising this Note; and
his family for their support.
1. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he presence or absence of acceptable noninfringing
alternatives does not matter.”).
3. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–
51 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
4. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Patent Damages and Real Options: How
Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to
Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 826 (2007) (“[A]n infringer could claim
that it would have continued to sell a noninfringing product that it had
actually been selling and that this product would have captured some of the
infringing sales. This argument would tend to limit the patent holder’s lost
sales. However, the infringer could not claim that it would have developed and
introduced some new noninfringing product in the but-for world and that this
product would have captured some of the infringing sales. Grain Processing
eased this restriction, allowing an infringer to claim that it would have offered
a noninfringing product that, although not actually sold in the marketplace,
was technically feasible at the time and could have been made commercially
available relatively quickly.”).
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when some infringement may be socially desirable.5 Grain
Processing allows for the potential avoidance of lost profit
damages, so long as the alleged infringer shows that it had the
necessary equipment, know-how, and experience to produce an
acceptable, noninfringing substitute during the alleged
infringement period.6
The Grain Processing decision, however, raises some
debate.7 As a judicially interjected gloss on damages, the added
ability to limit damage awards to a reasonable royalty could
have been too drastic.8 A closer look demonstrates a precarious
policy balance. On the one hand, increases in patent litigation9

5. David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1791 (2012); cf. Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1 (“[S]ome patents are so broad that they allow
patent holders to claim sweeping ownership of seemingly unrelated products
built by others. Often, companies are sued for violating patents they never
knew existed or never dreamed might apply to their creations, at a cost
shouldered by consumers in the form of higher prices and fewer choices.”);
Matthew Yglesias, Why Should We Stop Online Piracy?, SLATE.COM (Jan. 18,
2012, 2:17 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/
01/sopa_stopping_online_piracy_would_be_a_social_and_economic_disaster_.h
tml (examining, in the context of illegal downloading, the idea that violating
intellectual property law could aid in reducing economic deadweight loss).
6. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1354 (“[T]he [district] court found that
American Maize had all of the necessary equipment, know-how, and
experience to use Process IV to make Lo-Dex 10 . . . .”). The Federal Circuit
went on to hold that “the district court did not err in considering an
alternative not on the market during the period of infringement, nor did it
clearly err in determining that the alternative was available, acceptable, and
precluded any lost profits.” Id. at 1356.
7. See Alexander I. Poltorak & Paul J. Lerner, Grain, Grain, Go Away,
INTELL. PROP. WORLDWIDE, http://www.generalpatent.com/files/Grain.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (“The test of noninfringing substitutes has never been as
clear as it might. The definition of ‘substitute’ and ‘available’ are both subject
to debate. In fact, this test ‘accounts for more appellate litigation . . . than any
other aspect of patent damages law,’ according to Paul M. Janicke in a 1993
American University Law Review article.”).
8. Id. (arguing that the Grain Processing standard lacks clarity and,
taken to its logical conclusion, limits the value of patents to a reasonable
royalty while additionally reducing the likelihood that a defendant will settle);
see also Mark Chretien, The Question of Availability: Grain Processing Corp.
v. American Maize-Products Co., 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1489, 1505 (2002)
(explaining that, although Grain Processing strays from legal precedent, the
case emphasizes the “creation of a realistic hypothetical marketplace for the
purpose of damage calculations”).
9. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6
(2012),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/
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might justify implementing an additional hurdle to potential
damage awards in order to further incentivize innovation.
Added rigor provided by Grain Processing may deter frivolous
and expensive litigation that might be asserted by patentees to
keep new innovators out of the market.10 But on the other
hand, if a market participant does unlawfully infringe, it is
certainly reasonable to believe that the infringer should pay
appropriate damages for the encroachment on another’s
intellectual property. Grain Processing’s lost-profit-limiting
defense against a patentee’s claim of entitlement to lost profits
damages may serve to deter potentially useful innovation by
increasing costs shouldered by patentees in defending their
patent rights.11
This Note analyzes six Federal Circuit cases appealing lost
profits determinations, decided both before and after Grain
Processing, and attempts to discern the impacts that Grain
Processing has had on patentees’ entitlements to lost profits.
This Note is organized in four parts. Part I provides the
historical and substantive context necessary to understand the
Grain Processing decision and examines important statutory
changes, especially their subsequent interpretation, both before
and after Grain Processing. Part II summarizes three pre-, as
well as three post-Grain Processing cases. Parts III and IV
dissect and analyze the holdings in these cases and evaluate
Grain Processing’s impact on patent damages.
I.

BACKGROUND

The general structure of patent infringement litigation can
be broken down into two steps: (1) claim construction; and (2) a

publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding a dramatic rise in
patent actions filed in 2011 over 2010).
10. See Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 5, at A1 (“One consequence of [patent
litigation] . . . is that patent disputes are suffocating the culture of start-ups
that has long fueled job growth and technological innovation.”).
11. Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 826–27 (“By providing potential
infringers with increased option value if they use the patented technology,
Grain Processing reduces the deterrent effect of litigation and therefore
encourages infringement. Consequently, it reduces the returns to research and
development, and so also the incentives to innovate.”); see also James J. Anton
& Dennis A. Yao, Finding “Lost” Profits: An Equilibrium Analysis of Patent
Infringement Damages, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 186, 188 (2007) (“[B]asing
damages on lost profits reduces the incentive to innovate relative to the
benchmark case (no infringement).”).
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comparison between the allegedly infringing product and
patent claim language as interpreted in the claim construction
step.12 First, as a matter of law, the court construes the “scope
and meaning” of each patent claim in order to define the
protection granted by the patent.13 Next, a fact finder compares
each claim to the allegedly infringing product to determine
whether that product has “infringed” by exceeding claim
limitations protected by the patent-in-suit.14 During this second
step, a fact finder may also determine the amount of damages
owed in the event the patent was violated.15
A patentee’s entitlement to, and amount of, patent
damages is firmly rooted in normative considerations, which
generally seek to further societal good.16 An exclusive right for
a patentee to make, use, and sell an invented article is meant
to incentivize useful innovation.17 But this time-limited
monopoly right, of malevolent repute,18 may also be generally
associated with “raising prices of commodities” and “hurt of
12. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 142
(2d ed. 2004); Shawn Kolitch, Patent Claim Construction: The Neglected
Preamble, OR. INTELL. PROP. NEWSL., Summer 2007, at 10, available at
http://www.khpatent.com/files/9492SJK_Patent_Claim_Construction.pdf.
13. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 142; Kolitch, supra note 12, at 10.
14. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 142–43; Kolitch, supra note 12, at 10.
15. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 181–82 (“When a court, with or without a
jury, finds a patent both valid and infringed, then it must decide what
remedies to grant the patentee . . . . [A] remedy available to a patentee is an
award of money damages to compensate for past infringement.”). But see infra
note 54 and accompanying text (discussing how the process may differ if the
trial is bifurcated).
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 217 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed.,
1982) (“The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common
law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of
individuals.”).
17. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (explaining that
patent laws confer the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
offering for sale a patented invention in the United States for the term of the
patent). The Patent Act “was passed for the purpose of encouraging useful
invention and promoting new and useful improvements by the protection and
stimulation thereby given to inventive genius . . . .” Id.
18. See Sheldon Richman, Patents Stifle Prosperity, PROJECT TO RESTORE
AM. (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.theprojecttorestoreamerica.com/Essay/
191/Patents-Stifle-Prosperity (“Intellectual ‘property’ throttles the competitive
process by bestowing monopoly power on big corporate players, creating
artificial scarcities at the expense of consumers and independent
entrepreneurs.”).
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trade.”19 Insofar as the Constitution gives the power to the
people to decide the delicate balance between the innovative
good and the monopoly bad,20 the U.S. patent law system
nonetheless vigorously defends against an infringer’s
encroachment on a patentee’s patent rights.21
Over the past two-hundred years, patent law damages
have largely been left to judicial determination.22 As a stern
admonition against an alleged infringer, reprimand in the form
of compensatory damages may be derived through a court’s or a
jury’s interpretation of expert calculation of the damages
necessary to compensate for infringement.23 Because the
system is concerned with compensation to the patent holder,
patentees have used their patent rights as a weapon, by
threatening litigation against other market players, to broaden
market penetration and to acquire new licensees.24 The threat

19. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [to]
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
21. See S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, A New Approach to Evaluation of the
American Patent System, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 555, 555 (1951) (“The
exclusiveness of patent rights is regarded as a short-term public welfare
monopoly which promotes the competitive economy of which the Patent
System is itself a vital part.”).
22. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (“Because no version of the Patent Act has
ever specified exactly how to calculate the compensatory or restitutionary
damages called for in the statutory text, the task of formulating workable
standards has always rested with the courts.”); see SmithKline Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing
that the amount of damages is a finding of fact subject to the “clearly
erroneous” standard of review, while “subsidiary decisions underlying a
damage theory are discretionary with the court, such as, the choice of an
accounting method for determining profit margin” and are reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard).
23. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 181–82 (“[One] remedy available to a
patentee is an award of money damages to compensate for past infringement.
While injunctions are a matter within the discretion of the judge, the
calculation of damages is a question for the jury.”); id. at 182 n.60 (“This is
assuming that the case was tried to a jury. If the parties waived their right to
a jury trial, the judge would determine all issues of fact, including the amount
of damages.”); see infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
24. See Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 5, at A1 (discussing a situation where
sudden business decisions utilized patents as a way to exclude other market
players in the voice recognition industry resulting in the investment of
“millions of dollars . . . set aside for research and development . . . [being]
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of, or actual, patent litigation and the potential for material
damages may stymy innovation by erecting an additional
barrier to market entry of an alleged infringer.25 More recent
debate has centered on the results of demanding a greater
degree of accuracy in damage determinations through more
extensive litigation,26 rather than stressing more efficient and
less costly means.
With infringement enforcement mechanisms left in the
hands of market participants, those who benefit from
constraining competitor activity in, or entry into, a marketplace
are given the tools necessary to threaten or force broad,
comprehensive litigation.27 In an atmosphere of “patent
floggings” of entering market participants accused of alleged
infringement, the courts have furnished these alleged
infringers with protection against damages in excess of a
reasonable royalty, namely through the Grain Processing
decision.28 An extensive battle over the more precise factors
from Grain Processing might benefit society by increasing the
redirected to lawyers and court fees”). Though perhaps not impacted by Grain
Processing since they do not commercialize inventions, non-practicing entities,
or “patent trolls,” also could be said to use patent rights as a weapon. Ahmed
J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent Law: Moving
Towards Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 836 (2012) (“A patent troll is an entity
that focuses solely on capitalizing on patent portfolios. The troll purchases or
otherwise obtains patents from other companies for the purposes of licensing
and enforcing them, rather than practicing any inventions covered by those
patents.”).
25. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2004) (“[T]he risk of being sued, and
demands by patent holders for royalty payments to avoid being sued, are seen
increasingly as major costs of bringing new products and processes to market.
Thus, the patent system—intended to foster and protect innovation—is
generating waste and uncertainty that hinders and threatens the innovative
process.”); see, e.g., Steve Lohr, Widening Scrutiny of Google’s Smartphone
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at B1 (describing a Federal Trade
Commission investigation into Google’s licensing practices with regards to its
patents on standard-essential technology for smartphones).
26. See Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent
Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698 (2004) (providing some current debate on
the accuracy-ease tradeoff, where a patentee might simply pay the infringer to
leave the market rather than deal with the cost and hassle of patent
litigation).
27. See, e.g., Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 5, at A1.
28. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341,
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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accuracy and fairness of the damages determination. But, the
reality may be that increased accuracy and cost in calculating
damages provided by more extensive litigation could lead to a
systemic loss by deterring useful litigation and wasting limited
resources best used for innovation.29 Whether the shield of
Grain Processing provides ample protection for defendants as a
well-adapted tool, or merely prolongs litigation and wastes
valuable resources, may reveal whether the courts have gone
too far, or not far enough, in injecting additional rigor into the
patent system.
A. BRIEF HISTORY
Law concerned with the allocation and degree of protection
afforded to a patentee has historically endeavored to walk the
fine line between monopoly rights and adequate patent
protection.30 The result of this balancing has exerted a
controlling grasp on the language and construction of today’s
patent law system. From 1870 to 1946, patent law allowed
recovery for the greater of “profits” made by the infringer or
“damages” sustained by the patentee caused by infringement.31
29. Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 852 (“Under Grain Processing, courts
permit an infringer to claim that in the but-for world it would have adopted an
existing noninfringing technology despite the fact that the infringer had never
done so. This free option transfers economic value to the infringer and
transfers economic value away from the patent holder. Thus, it decreases the
economic incentives to innovate, which is one of the primary goals of the U.S.
patent system.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley,
Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical Exclusion
Payments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 712, 712 (2003) (“[L]aw must often choose
between simple rules that are prone to error and more complex rules that are
more accurate but harder to administer.”); see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 29–36 (1995) (proposing that a return to simple
legal rules would have efficiency- and cost-related benefits).
30. See, e.g., Ramon A. Klitzke, Patents and Monopolization: The Role of
Patents Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 557, 560–62
(1985) (“The owner of the patent has the right to exclude others from making,
using or selling the patented invention . . . . Thus, there is power to exclude
competition . . . . Consequently, it is necessary to forge a compromise between
the conflicting policies of rewarding the inventor for the voluntary public
disclosure of the invention while protecting the public from untoward
intrusions into the domain of a free and open competitive market in which all
competitors can participate without unreasonable restraints.” (footnote
omitted)).
31. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 6, § 4921, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (“[U]pon a
decree being rendered in any such case for an infringement the complainant
shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the
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The distinction between the two methods may only be a
remnant of the law-equity court system, because courts of law
only allowed damages while courts of equity only allowed
disgorgement of profit.32 Justification for profit recovery during
this
period
relied
upon
“word-play
and
fiction . . . characteriz[ing] such infringer’s profits as ‘unjust
enrichment’ or ‘constructive trust,’ then in effect order[ing]
‘restitution’ thereof, and then denominat[ing] the result as
‘damages.’”33 As a result, courts would characterize either
method of recovery as remedial.34 Profit recovery, however,
could have historically played a punitive role, at least in part.35
Once a patentee’s rights were violated, retribution would be
handed out by judicial sanction with the infringer’s profit as
the amount due the patentee.36 Thus, historically, the patent
system embraced a variety of ways a patentee could opt to
enforce its right to exclude others.37
The statutory precursor to the damage provisions of the
Patent Act of 1952 came into effect in 1946.38 The damages

defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby . . . .”); Blair &
Cotter, supra note 22, at 6; DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW 1286 (3d ed. 2004); see Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298
U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (“In patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is
‘profits,’ what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement is
‘damages.’” (quoting Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 306,
306 (2d Cir. 1908))).
32. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1285.
33. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
34. Id. at 539.
35. See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(examining disgorgement of profit from “‘[j]udicial sanctions in civil contempt
proceedings . . . [as] employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the
defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the
complainant for losses sustained’” (quoting United States v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947))). Compare DOUG RENDLEMAN,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT
865–66 (2010) (examining whether disgorgement of profits in a contempt
proceeding is actually a penalty/fine for criminal contempt), with Leman v.
Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 453–57 (1932) (describing profit
disgorgement as full compensation in a contempt proceeding as remedial, not
penal, in nature).
36. See Spindelfabrik, 903 F.2d at 1578–80.
37. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1285–86.
38. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778; Blair & Cotter, supra note
22, at 6.
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portion of the 1946 act advanced to roughly its present form
and revised the historic “damages or profits” language.39 After
passage, the Supreme Court effectively interpreted away
Congress’s omission of profit recovery as divesting courts of
authority to order “restitutionary relief.”40 Under the 1946 Act,
only “general damages” in the form of “due compensation” were
recoverable.41 The purpose of the change was to restrict
compensation to the value of the loss rather than the value of
the infringer’s gain.42 By eliminating profit recovery, Congress
sought to ensure that the patentee would receive full
compensation for “any damages” he suffered as a result of the
infringement.43 The patentee could not, as a matter of common
law, recover prejudgment interest.44 Accordingly, the damages
39. Compare Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. 389, 392
(“[T]he complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be
accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained
thereby . . . .”), with Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (“[T]he
complainant shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be due
compensation . . . .”).
40. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1286 (“In 1946, Congress again
changed the law in a way that was later interpreted by the Supreme Court to
eliminate effectively the patentee’s right to obtain the infringer’s profits.”); see
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505–07
(1964); Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 6–7.
41. Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (“[U]pon a judgment being
rendered in any case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to
recover general damages which shall be due compensation for making, using,
or selling the invention . . . .”).
42. Aro, 377 U.S. at 505–06 (“‘The object of the bill is to make the basis of
recovery in patent-infringement suits general damages, that is, any damages
the complainant can prove, not less than a reasonable royalty, together with
interest from the time infringement occurred, rather than profits and
damages.’ There can be no doubt that the amendment succeeded in
effectuating this purpose; it is clear that under the present statute only
damages are recoverable.” (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587,
at 1–2 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946) (remarks of Senator Pepper)));
see also Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 668 (2010) (“Justice
Brennan categorically declares the ‘clear’ congressional purpose was to
eliminate recovery stemming from the infringer’s profits.”).
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587, at 1 (1946) (“The object of the bill is to
make the basis of recovery in patent-infringement suits general damages, that
is, any damages the complainant can prove . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2
(1946).
44. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 651 (1983) (“Prior to
1946 the provision of the patent laws concerning a plaintiff’s recovery in an
infringement action contained no reference to interest. The award of interest
in patent cases was governed by the common law standard enunciated in
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regime moved toward “award[ing] the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement.”45
The 1952 revisions to the Patent Act were adopted for the
purpose of clarifying the overall presentation and readability of
statutory structure.46 The 1946 rule, which granted the
patentee compensatory damages upon proof of infringement,
was readopted.47 The Supreme Court has since clarified the
standard as the amount the patentee would have made “had
the infringer not infringed.”48 Further, the Supreme Court, in
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., allowed recovery of prejudgment interest as a part of compensatory damages, which
was not previously allowed under the 1946 common-law
standard.49
B. BROADER POLICY IMPLICATIONS
While much has changed throughout U.S. patent law
history, systemic patent law goals have remained the same.
The goals of compensation to aggrieved patentees and
deterrence of infringement continue to underlie present legal
determinations.50 These twin aims, however, are based upon
the assumption that they increase, rather than decrease,

several decisions of this Court.” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Duplate Corp. v.
Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 459 (1936) (discussing the common law
standard denying prejudgment interest).
45. Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 655 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284); see also RicWil Co. v. E. B. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 1950).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10, 29 (1952).
47. See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) (“[T]he court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer . . . .”).
48. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964).
49. Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 653 (“We have little doubt that § 284 does not
incorporate the Duplate standard. Under that standard, which evolved as a
matter of federal common law, prejudgment interest could not be awarded
where damages were unliquidated, absent bad faith or other exceptional
circumstances. By contrast, § 284 gives a court general authority to fix
interest and costs. On the face of § 284, a court’s authority to award interest is
not restricted to exceptional circumstances . . . .”).
50. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1284 (“One infringement-remedy
goal is to compensate for past infringement . . . . The other . . . is to prevent
future infringement.”).
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societal good,51 even though allowance for some forms of lesser
punishment for infringement may potentially lead to more and
rapid innovative gains. In this way, the degree of punishment
experienced or avoided by an infringer can be seen as one of the
ingredients of innovation. So, in a Darwinian marketplace,
factors that affect participants, such as needs for adequate
market returns or an enhanced learning-curve advantage over
competitors, coexist with concerns about patent infringement,
and altogether they provide incentives to innovate.52
C. DAMAGE REMEDIES
1. Use of Jury, Bifurcation, and Damages Experts
During the course of litigation, a patentee often relies upon
specialized experts to assess infringement damages allegedly
caused by the infringer.53 Because arguments over damages are
necessary only after a jury decides whether or not a patent is
infringed, trials are sometimes bifurcated.54 In this way, a trial
is initially conducted to determine the existence of the alleged
infringer’s liability, and if liability against the infringer is
found, a further proceeding addresses damages.55 Separating a
trial into two parts may help focus issues and may avoid

51. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Notice and Patent Remedies, 88
TEX. L. REV. 221, 221–30 (2011) (providing an in-depth discussion of the
tradeoffs between the patent system’s two goals of compensation and
deterrence).
52. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, Competition Policy, Patent
Law, and Innovation: Welcoming Remarks for the Patent Reform Conference
(June
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/
050609comppolicy.pdf.
53. See Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent
Cases, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5 (1999) (“The damages phase of a patent lawsuit
involves testimony on the amount and methodology of computing damages,
and, if lost profits are sought, the appropriateness of awarding damages.
Generally, there are four categories of damages experts: (1) accounting
experts; (2) patent licensing experts; (3) industry experts; and (4)
economists.”).
54. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 178 (“One common practice is to hold
separate trials on liability and damages. If the infringer is not found liable,
there is no need to proceed with the damages phase.”); see Kathleen B.
Shields, The Bifurcation Divide, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.choate.com/uploads/113/doc/Shields,%20Lee%20-%20Law360%20%20The%20Bifurcation%20Divide.pdf (discussing some of the costs and
benefits of bifurcation and the varying views of its usage in patent trials).
55. Shields, supra note 54.
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confusion of the jury, as well as save unnecessary effort.56 In
many patent infringement cases, however, trials are not
bifurcated for purported reasons of cost and efficiency.57 In
these cases, the same jury makes both liability and damages
determinations in the same trial.58 Litigants may decide to
retain damages experts far in advance of trial to assess
complex damages issues.59 Accordingly, experts calculate
damages under the presumption of infringement by the
defendant.60
2. Georgia-Pacific Defines Reasonable Royalty Damages
If infringement of a patent-in-suit is ultimately found
against an alleged infringer, the patentee is entitled to no less
than a reasonable royalty as compensation.61 A royalty is a
payment made to the patent holder by a licensee in exchange
for the right to make, use, sell, or import the patented article.62
56. Id.
57. E.g., In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(referring to bifurcation as “too onerous to be regularly employed”); Trading
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836–37 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(“Although the ultimate decision to bifurcate is within our discretion, because
we are expected to act to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action, bifurcation remains the exception, not the rule.
Patent cases are no exception to this rule. The party seeking separate trials
has the burden of showing that judicial economy would be served and the
balance of potential prejudice weighs in favor of bifurcation.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
58. See DURHAM, supra note 12, at 181–82.
59. See, e.g., JOHN O. MIRICK & KENNETH C. PICKERING, MASSACHUSETTS
EXPERT WITNESSES 2-2 to 2-3 (2d ed. 2010); Poplawski, supra note 53, at 17
(“As most patent cases do not reach the damage phase of trial, because of
settlement, damages experts are not ordinarily retained at the initial stages of
the litigation. Therefore, many litigants conclude that early use of damages
experts amounts to considerable unnecessary expense. Nevertheless, where
the damages issues are complex or the potential damages are relatively high,
trial counsel would do well to retain damages experts at an earlier stage in the
litigation.”).
60. Poplawski, supra note 53, at 17.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court.”).
62. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 47 (“A licensor retains ownership of the
patent but grants the licensee the right to practice the claimed invention,
usually in exchange for some sort of royalty.”); see Philip Mendes, To License a
Patent—Or to Assign It: Factors Influencing Choice, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
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In the normal course of business, such royalties result from the
willing negotiations between a licensee and a patent holder of
the patented article.63 Once the parties have instead sought
resolution through litigation, however, discussions are far
removed from “willing” negotiations that exist in the normal
course of business.64 In determining what constitutes a
“reasonable royalty” for the purpose of damage remedy, the
court in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.
enumerated fifteen factors,65 which have since been used by
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/license_assign_patent.htm#
author (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
63. Cf. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 183 (“A reasonable royalty is the
amount that the infringer would have paid the patentee if, instead of
infringing the patent, it had negotiated a license.”).
64. Cf. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to
reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who
desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell
a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have been
willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and
which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was
willing to grant a license.”).
65. Id. The court enumerated the following factors:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the
patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents
comparable to the patent in suit. 3. The nature and scope of the
license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or nonrestricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold. 4. The licensor’s established
policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly
by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that
monopoly. 5. The commercial relationship between the licensor
and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same
territory in the same line of business; or whether they are
inventor and promoter. 6. The effect of selling the patented
specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee;
that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator
of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such
derivative or convoyed sales. 7. The duration of the patent and
term of the license. 8. The established profitability of the product
made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current
popularity. 9. The utility and advantages of the patent property
over the old modes or devices; if any, that had been for working
out similar results. 10. The nature of the patented invention; the
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courts to construct a “hypothetical negotiation” between the
parties to litigation.66 A reasonable royalty is viewed as the
statutory minimum amount necessary to compensate the
patentee for the defendant’s infringement, once liability is
found.67
3. The Panduit Test and Entitlement to Lost Profits
To avoid what some view as less-than-adequate
compensation under Georgia-Pacific’s reasonable-royalty
calculation,68 plaintiffs may seek to assess their entitlement to

character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and
produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used
the invention. 11. The extent to which the infringer has made use
of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that
use. 12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may
be customary in the particular business or in comparable
businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous
inventions. 13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 14.
The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 15. The amount that
a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement
began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to
reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a
license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying
the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who
was willing to grant a license.
Id.
66. See DURHAM, supra note 12, at 184.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court.”).
68. See generally Patent Damages Primer: Damages Under the Patent
Statute, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/primer/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2013) (“A danger in the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach,
particularly for the infringer, is taking the name too literally and building a
damages defense around a very low actual royalty rate the parties might have
negotiated in the real world. Reasonable royalty damages can be different
from any pre-infringement, real-world royalty the parties would have actually
negotiated. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has routinely affirmed ‘reasonable

2014]

ACCURACY OR EFFICIENCY?

667

lost profits.69 These are profits the patentee would have made
without the defendant’s alleged infringement.70 In Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit articulated a fundamental framework providing four
factors that govern the determination of a plaintiff’s
entitlement to recover lost profits due to infringement.71 This is
“the most widely used test for determining lost-profits
damages,” and is employed by the Federal Circuit as an
“acceptable method of determining profits.”72 In short, Panduit
describes a four-step test to determine how events would have
transpired in a relevant marketplace “but for” the defendant’s
alleged infringement.73
4. Grain Processing Is Critical to Panduit Analysis
The Panduit factors are applied in damages assessments to
determine whether, without the infringer’s actions in the
relevant market, the patentee could have captured the sales
and profits made by the infringer.74 Panduit requires that the

royalty’ awards in excess of what the parties would have actually agreed to as
a result of licensing negotiations prior to infringement.”).
69. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable
Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 661 (2009) (“[I]t is not only possible
but common that lost profits will exceed the defendant’s gains from
infringement. The idea that patent damages tend to be greater in lost profits
cases than in reasonable royalty cases makes sense for policy purposes, so long
as the reasonable royalty awards go to patentees who are not in fact selling
products in the market.” (footnote omitted)).
70. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 417 (2d
ed. 1991) (“Lost profits may be in the form of diverted sales, eroded prices, or
increased expenses.”); Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 827 (“A patent holder
can lose profits to an infringer in several ways. By far the most important
source of lost profits is the sales that the patent holder lost to the infringer.
Absent the infringement (often termed the “but-for” world), the patent holder
would have made some or all of the sales that the infringer made. The
damages associated with these lost sales are the incremental profits that the
patent holder would have made on the sales.” (footnotes omitted)).
71. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th
Cir. 1978); Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 833 (“In attempting to ascertain
whether to award lost profits, American courts often refer to the ‘Panduit
factors,’ all of which must be satisfied for an award of lost profits . . . .”).
72. Chretien, supra note 8, at 1495–96.
73. Id.
74. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“To get lost profits as actual damages, the patent owner must
demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the
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plaintiff prove (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence
of acceptable noninfringing substitutes; (3) the plaintiff’s
capabilities to manufacture and market; and thus exploit
market demand; and (4) the amount of the profit the plaintiff
would have earned “but for” the infringement.75
In many cases, the plaintiff may readily qualify under
several of the Panduit factors. The first Panduit factor, demand
for the patented product, is established by examining the
existing and forecasted product sales enjoyed by the patent
holder or its licensees.76 As a practical matter, a patent holder’s
established relationship with its licensee, or as a current
participant in the relevant market, make this determination of
patented product sales readily amenable to economic
analysis.77 Similarly, the plaintiff may be aided by ease of
access to the information necessary to show the marketing and
manufacturing capabilities required under the third Panduit
factor.78 Calculation of the profits lost “but-for” infringement,
the fourth factor, logically flows from establishing proof of the
“demand” and “supply” factors,79 and requires an “estimation of

infringement, it would have made the infringer’s sales . . . . [W]e have
accepted [Panduit] as a nonexclusive standard for determining lost profits.”).
75. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156.
76. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he first Panduit factor simply asks whether demand
existed for the patented product, i.e., a product that is covered by the patent in
suit’ or that ‘directly competes with the infringing device.’” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 598
(5th Cir. 1963) (“The substantial sales made prove a demand.”).
77. See MICHAEL C. KEELEY, ESTIMATING DAMAGES IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (1999), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/d578b7e4-be8d-4b0a-9cd5a79d1081b866/Estimating-Damages-in-Patent-Infringement-Cases.aspx.
78. Cf. Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 17–18 (“To satisfy the third
factor, capacity to exploit the demand for the patented product, the patent
owner may need to present evidence of such things as excess manufacturing
capacity, ability to obtain financing, and ability to market additional units of
the product. Disputes most frequently center, however, on application of the
second factor . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
79. See KEELEY, supra note 77, at 5 (“[T]he fourth Panduit factor requires
economic analysis of the incremental costs the firm would have incurred in
meeting [additional] demand. This relates to the third Panduit factor,
‘manufacturing and marketing capacity.’”). Of course, the first Panduit factor
would also aid in this incremental cost analysis by determining what the
demand is for the particular product.
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the patent holder’s incremental profit on the additional
sales.”80
In contrast to these three factors, the remaining Panduit
factor, involving absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, remains a substantial hurdle to the plaintiff’s
claim for lost profits.81 Generally, the plaintiff must show that
during the period of infringement, or the “accounting period,”
the plaintiff’s customers purchased the defendant’s product
specifically because of the advantages bestowed upon that
product by the allegedly infringed patent.82 Put differently,
without the patented advantages, customers would not have
purchased the allegedly infringing product at the price or terms
offered. Complicating proof of the second factor, competing
products are generally not “perfect substitutes” in the
marketplace, which leaves open disputes pertaining to the
degree of substitutability.83 Also, the difficulty of proving the
absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes has been made
more challenging by the addition of criteria from Grain
Processing, upon which the alleged infringer can rely.84
D. GRAIN PROCESSING
1. Procedural History
On appeal from the Northern District of Indiana, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Grain
Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co. issued a
panel decision in 1999 to deny lost profits damages to the

80. Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 834.
81. See KEELEY, supra note 77, at 4 (providing an example of calculating
the “degree of substitution” of a product and the uncertainty and difficulty
some demand-and-supply-side factors may cause in the calculation of
Panduit’s second “absence of noninfringing alternatives” element); Blair &
Cotter, supra note 22, at 18–20.
82. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Thus, to prove that there are no acceptable
noninfringing substitutes, the patent owner must show either that (1) the
purchasers in the marketplace generally were willing to buy the patented
product for its advantages, or (2) the specific purchasers of the infringing
product purchased on that basis.”).
83. See KEELEY, supra note 77, at 5.
84. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc. 318 F.3d 1119, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(discussing the additional criteria under Grain Processing of equipment,
know-how, and experience in order to show availability of a non-infringing
alternative); Chretien, supra note 8, at 1505.
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patentee following a complex procedural history.85 The court
ruled that the defendant proved that a noninfringing substitute
was available even though the substitute was not, in fact, on
the market or actually for sale during the period of alleged
infringement.86 Furthermore, the court held that the patentee
failed to show lost profits under a required reconstruction of
the market as it would have developed “but for” the defendant’s
alleged infringement.87 The court opined that even though the
defendant’s substitute was not perfect, it was an “acceptable”
substitute, thus satisfying Panduit, because the differences
between the patented product and its substitute were
“irrelevant to consumers.”88
2. The Legal Contribution of Grain Processing
Grain Processing has substantially altered modern lost
profits analysis. Prior analysis was conducted to determine
whether infringement of a particular patented article caused
the patentee to lose customers,89 and to quantify the sort of
sales the patentee would have made absent the infringement.90
In Grain Processing, however, the Federal Circuit examined
the value of the patentee’s exclusionary right in a “but for”
marketplace, which is described as a “hypothetical world”

85. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s second decision denying lost
profits to Grain Processing Corporation); Grain Processing Corp. v. Am.
Maize-Prods. Co., Nos. 95-1506, 95-1507, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9918 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 20, 1997) (vacating the district court’s decision in an unpublished
opinion); Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 979 F. Supp. 1233
(N.D. Ind. 1997) (reaffirming its previous decision to deny lost profits to Grain
Processing Corporation on the same non-infringing substitutes grounds);
Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (holding that Grain Processing Corporation could not prove lost profits
damages because of the availability of non-infringing substitutes).
86. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1356 (“Thus, with proper economic proof
of availability, as American Maize provided the district court in this case, an
acceptable substitute not on the market during the infringement may
nonetheless become part of the lost profits calculus and therefore limit or
preclude those damages.”).
87. Id. at 1355.
88. Id. at 1348 (discussing the conclusions of the district court, which the
Federal Circuit affirmed).
89. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 162
n.57 (1999) (“Earlier cases had focused on whether customer demand for the
entire item could be attributed to the patented component or feature.”).
90. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1287.
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absent the alleged infringement.91 As a result, the inquiry was
supplemented with an additional determination that sought to
assess “alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have
undertaken had he not infringed.”92 Perhaps this
determination had signaled a meaningful shift in court
rationale and had brought legal analysis more in line with the
economic realities of patent infringement.93 However, it seems
that if a “perfect market substitute” could potentially be
concocted and made available by the alleged infringer, it
follows that a patentee’s right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling that article has little value.94 The patentee’s
remedy for infringement would then be limited to payment for
a license, typically a reasonable royalty.95
3. Effect of Grain Processing on Legal Standard
The court in Grain Processing, therefore, transformed the
mechanical application of a once bright-line legal standard into
a more accurate determination with substantial evidence on
both sides of the issue.96 Grain Processing has since stood for
the proposition that even if the plaintiff substantially proves
that most of the Panduit factors are satisfied, the alleged
infringer may avoid paying lost profits damages by showing
that it simply had the “equipment” and “know-how” necessary
to “instantaneously” produce and introduce a consumeracceptable, noninfringing substitute with “little effort.”97 This
approach marked a noticeable shift in the Federal Circuit’s
move “towards a more thoughtful consideration of economic

91. Id.
92. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350–51.
93. See Chretien, supra note 8, at 1514 (“Grain Processing is an example
of the recent trend of using economic principles to address . . . problems in
patent damage calculations. Proponents of this approach assert that economicbased analysis improves the chances that damage awards will provide
adequate compensation to the patent holder.” (footnote omitted)).
94. See Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 835.
95. See Chretien, supra note 8, at 1506, 1518–19; Georgia-Pac. Corp. v.
U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
96. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[F]air and
accurate reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market also must take into account,
where relevant, alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have
undertaken had he not infringed.”).
97. See id.
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realities.”98 Grain Processing has remained reliable precedent,
and its principles were reaffirmed in Sprectralytics, Inc. v.
Cordis Corp. in 2011.99
II. PRE- AND POST-GRAIN PROCESSING CASES
The following section summarizes court actions resulting
from six Federal Circuit lost profits appeals. Three of these
appeals were decided pre-Grain Processing and three others
post-Grain Processing.100 This Note uses these cases as factual
inputs to further understand the Grain Processing decision,
and analyzes both sets of cases to observe regular economic
assumptions the courts have used in the normal course of their
lost profits damages analysis.
A. PRE-GRAIN PROCESSING CASES
1. State Industries Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc.
State Industries Inc., v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. involved a
patent covering a method of insulating residential gas water
heaters.101 State argued that the damages award, which
combined a reasonable royalty and lost profits, was too low in
light of the gross profits Mor-Flo had made selling an allegedly
infringing product.102 Mor-Flo disagreed, maintaining that
98. Michael A. Morin, Processing Grain: Lost Profits Damages and Some
Practical Considerations for the Patent Litigator, FINNEGAN.COM,
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=c29ba55
0-8c55-4b4f-a9a5-b2c72b1749c4 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
99. See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
100. These cases were selected from a small pool of relevant cases that
seemed to turn on facts similar to the Grain Processing inquiry. All were
published opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
101. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 883 F.2d 1573, 1575–76 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). At the time of this litigation, two types of water heater insulation—
fiberglass and foam—dominated the market. State’s method involved an
effective way of injecting foam insulation into the heater while also preventing
the foam from invading the water heater’s working components. The process
involved wrapping the heater with an envelope-shaped plastic sheet,
mounting a surrounding metal jacket and cover, and finally injecting foam
through an opening into the envelope. Mor-Flo’s method, on the other hand,
used a cylindrical-shaped rather than an envelope-shaped plastic sheet, and
injected foam through the top. Id.
102. State had cross-appealed a favorable judgment from the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee awarding lost profit damages due
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there were other acceptable noninfringing alternatives to the
alleged infringing product on the market.103
Despite Mor-Flo’s arguments, the court upheld the lost
profits damages because there were no acceptable
noninfringing alternatives on the market during the
infringement period.104 The court rejected common fiberglass
insulation as an acceptable substitute for foam insulation
included in the litigant’s water heaters.105 In addition, the
court turned to comparisons between three foam insulation
methods that were arguably available at the time of
infringement.106 The court concluded that none of the three
foam insulations were sufficiently available noninfringing
alternatives.107 State v. Mor-Flo is also noted for the court’s
market-share approach, which considers the amount of
relevant market share the patent holder lost to infringing
competitors as a basis for damages.108

to infringement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1989
affirmed the lower court’s decision but vacated and remanded for
reconsideration of willful infringement and enhanced damages. Id.
103. Id. at 1579.
104. Id. at 1578–79.
105. Id. However, the court later reduced the reasonable royalty because
fiberglass insulation did directly compete with foam. Id. at 1581. Further,
foam insulation was superior as a denser material having greater insulating
qualities, added dent resistance, and allowed for smaller heaters. Id. at 1576.
106. Id. at 1579.
107. Two of these methods—the “top-off” method and the fiberglass “foam
stop” method—failed as redeeming substitutes because Mor-Flo had
insufficient evidence to prove with certainty that either method was in fact
available during the infringement period. Id. But it did not prove that either
the “top-off” method or fiberglass foam stops were available during the period
of infringement. Id. Mor-Flo’s competitor even testified that they had started
using the “top-off” method during the infringement period, but he was unsure
when. Id. The third method—the Rheem-patented plastic foam belt—was
actually used by Rheem during the period of infringement. Id. The court,
however, dismissed the Rheem method as an acceptable alternative because
Mor-Flo presented no evidence showing that the method could have been
licensed and at what cost. Id. at 1581. As a result, lost profit damages were
upheld because there were no acceptable non-infringing alternatives on the
market during the infringement period. Id. at 1579.
108. Id. at 1576; see Roy J. Epstein, The Market Share Rule with Price
Erosion: Patent Infringement Lost Profits Damages After Crystal, 31 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 3–4 (2003).
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2. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp. concerned an industrial-product
patent for an interferometer.109 On appeal Wyko, the alleged
infringer, argued that lost profits damages were inappropriate
because its previously discontinued interferometer, named
SIRIS, was an acceptable noninfringing alternative.110 Zygo’s
main assertion was that Wyko’s previous SIRIS model was
discontinued and not actually available on the market.111
The court was unconvinced that Zygo was entitled to lost
profits as Wyko’s SIRIS strongly resembled an acceptable
noninfringing alternative. The court favorably compared
Wyko’s SIRIS model with Zygo’s Mark IV.112 The court also
considered SIRIS similar to Wyko’s new “Wyko 6000” model.113
Satisfied with its determination that SIRIS was an “acceptable”
alternative, the court vacated and remanded Zygo’s lost profits
award back to the trial court.114

109. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996). An
interferometer is a device used to measure wavelengths, wave velocities, small
distances, and thicknesses. See Rüdiger Paschotta, Interferometers,
ENCYCLOPEDIA LASER PHYSICS & TECH., http://www.rp-photonics.com/
interferometers.html (last updated May 28, 2013).
110. Zygo, 79 F.3d at 1565–66. Wyko Corp. appealed an adverse judgment
of infringement by the U.S. Federal District Court of Arizona. Id. at 1565. In
1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s finding of infringement for one model, the Wyko 6000, but reversed the
finding of infringement for the second, the Wyko 6000 “redesign.” Id. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the trial
court in order to recalculate damages. Id.
111. Wyko had discontinued its SIRIS model after it began to market and
produce the Wyko 6000. Id. at 1571.
112. Id. at 1571. The court noted that SIRIS could test the same
components, serve the same applications, and “there was nothing the Mark IV
could do that the SIRIS . . . could not.” Id. Further, the court found that SIRIS
and the Mark IV were both the same type of “phase-shifting Fizeau type
interferometer.” Id.
113. The court observed that SIRIS was simply “repackaged” and renamed
the Wyko 6000 and that software used for both of Wyko’s models was
“basically the same.” Id.
114. Id. at 1571–72. The remand, however, included the important caveat
noting that the non-infringing alternative must be “actual[ly] availabl[e]
during some of the period the . . . Wyko [6000] models were on the market.” Id.
at 1571. The court reasoned that the lost profits calculation was only a
reflection of sales actually lost, not the “possibilit[y] of a hypothetical market
which the infringer might have created.” Id.
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3. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc. involved a productpatent lawsuit over a microfiltration membrane.115 The
damages issue on appeal was whether an acceptable
noninfringing alternative prevented Pall’s entitlement to lost
profit damages.116 Pall asserted that the noninfringing
alternative did not bar lost profits entitlement, but also that it
was entitled to lost profits on all of Micron’s infringing sales.117
The court held that availability of an acceptable
noninfringing alternative did not preclude Pall’s entitlement to
lost profits.118 The court acknowledged that an acceptable
noninfringing alternative to Micron’s membrane existed in the
nylon membrane market, made by Cuno. But, prior to the PallMicron litigation, Cuno’s membrane infringed upon Pall’s
patent,119 and Cuno had already entered into a licensing
settlement with Pall. The court explored the impact of Cuno’s
licensing settlement with Pall on Micron’s infringing
membrane.120 As a result, the court held that Pall was entitled
to lost profits because the only acceptable alternative, Cuno’s

115. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
1995). Microfiltration membranes are used to remove unwanted microscopic
substances, such as bacteria, from fluids or to separate desired substances,
such as antibodies. See Microfiltration Membrane Systems, SIEMENS,
http://www.water.siemens.com/en/products/membrane_filtration_separation/m
icrofiltration_membrane_systems/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 7,
2013).
116. Pall, 66 F.3d at 1222. Both parties appealed judgment of the U.S.
District Court of Massachusetts finding Micron Separations had infringed,
entitling Pall Corp. to damages. Id. at 1214–15. In 1995, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding of willful
infringement, modifying and remanding the damages award back to the trial
court for redetermination. Id. at 1215. The district court held that another
participant in the nylon membrane industry, Cuno Corporation, was
marketing an acceptable noninfringing alternative. Id. at 1222. Cuno’s
membrane alternative, however, had previously been the subject of litigation
with Pall, prior to Pall’s lawsuit against Micron. Id. at 1222–23.
117. Id. at 1222.
118. Cuno’s “voluntary settlement” with Pall did “not retrospectively
transform an accused infringing product into a ‘noninfringing substitute,’” for
the purposes of litigation with Micron. Id. at 1222–23.
119. Id. at 1222. The court limited the award of lost profits to the share of
Micron’s sales that Pall would reasonably have made, taking into account
Cuno’s post-settlement sales with Pall. Id. at 1223.
120. Id. at 1222–23.
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membrane, was really an infringing one.121 Pall suggests that a
compromise exists between patent value and a patentee’s
entitlement to compensation in that lost profits were
recognized but reduced accordingly.122
B. POST-GRAIN PROCESSING CASES
1. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain
Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.
Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain
Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. involved a product-patent dispute
over a particular type of scintillator crystal used in its positron
emission tomography machines, also known as PET
scanners.123 Saint-Gobain, the alleged infringer, argued that
the existence of two acceptable noninfringing alternatives
defeated Siemens’ entitlement to lost profits.124 Siemens
responded that both alternatives were inferior and were
therefore not sufficiently acceptable noninfringing alternatives
in the “high-end” marketplace.125

121. Id. The lower court’s damage award was affirmed, but damages as a
result of Cuno’s settlement with Pall were remanded for recalculation. Id. at
1223.
122. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
123. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Positron emission tomography
(“PET”) is a nuclear medical imaging technique that provides images and
information about the chemical structure and function of a patient’s organ
systems. See Positron Emission Tomography, MAYO CLINIC (May 7, 2011),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pet-scan/MY00238.
124. Siemens, 637 F.3d at 1287. The essential damages issue involved
Siemen’s cross-appeal that the U.S. District Court of Delaware had erred in
granting Saint-Gobain’s motion for judgment as a matter of law reducing the
jury’s award of damages. Id. at 1274. The jury found that the defendant had
infringed upon the plaintiff’s patent and awarded $52.3 million in damages.
Id. at 1276. The judgment was reduced to $44.9 million by the trial court. Id.
In 2011 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision on infringement but vacated and remanded the damages
award, as it was understated by not including a reasonable royalty for those
products that were made but not sold by the infringer. Id. at 1290–91. There
were two possible noninfringing alternatives: one alternative, made by
General Electric, used bismuth germinate scintillator (“BGO”) crystals. The
other was a lanthanum bromide (“LaBr3”) scintillator crystal that SaintGobain arguably could have produced. Id. at 1287.
125. Id. at 1288. There was testimony that BGO-based scanners did not
compete with Siemens’ scanners in the high-end PET scanner market because
BGO scanners had relatively low image quality and were purchased by low-
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The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a lack
of acceptable noninfringing alternatives to permit Siemens to
recover lost profits.126 The court evaluated the acceptability of
Saint-Gobain’s argued alternatives,127 and, using the Grain
Processing standard, gauged whether the noninfringing
alternatives were actually available or on the market during
the infringement period.128 Despite evidence that Siemens’
scintillator crystal was comparable to General Electric’s,129 the
court
found
Saint
Gobain’s
noninfringing-alternative
arguments unavailing and upheld Siemens’ entitlement to lost
profits.130
2. Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc.
Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc. involved a patent over
a livestock and poultry feed-dispensing machine.131 Lextron
argued, and a lower court found, that its Type 5 machine was
an acceptable and available noninfringing substitute, which
barred Micro’s entitlement to lost profits.132
On appeal, the court found the lower court’s assessment
unpersuasive and allowed Micro to present its case for lost
profits.133 The court first conducted an in-depth analysis of the
Grain Processing standards for availability of noninfringing
alternatives.134 After examination of whether Lextron had the
budget customers while Siemen scanners were more expensive and were
purchased by customers seeking the best in performance and technology. Id.
at 1288.
126. Id. at 1289.
127. Id. at 1288–89 (deciding whether there was a two-supplier, high-end
market for PET scanners).
128. Id. at 1288 (“Notwithstanding, the evidence reasonably supported a
finding that LaBr3 was not an available alternative.”).
129. Id. at 1287 (“Saint-Gobain contends that GE’s BGO scanners
competed with Siemens’ LSO scanners, because Siemens lost PET scanner
sales to GE.”).
130. Id. at 1288 (“We perceive no legal error in the district court’s decision
to permit the jury to award lost profits damages.”).
131. Micro Chem. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Both Micro Chem. and Lextron placed their machines in customer feedlots at
no charge, allowing them to sell microingredients to the feedlots at a
premium.
132. Id. at 1121–23.
133. Id. at 1126.
134. Id. at 1223–24. The court reversed the district court’s finding that the
Lextron Type 5 machine was available. Id. at 1224. Lextron therefore did not
have the “necessary equipment, know-how, and experience to make the Type 5
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equipment, know-how, and experience to manufacture and
substitute its noninfringing machine for the allegedly
infringing one, the court concluded that a noninfringing
machine was not sufficiently available at the time of
infringement.135 The court also held that Lextron had instead
attempted to design around Micro’s patented technology after
the suit was brought.136
3. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc.
Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc. concerned technology
used in vending machines to authenticate coins.137 Mars argued
it was entitled to lost profits based on sales made prior to Coin
Acceptor’s (“Coinco’s”) introduction of alternative technology.138
Coinco argued that lost profits should have been entirely
excluded from calculation of a lost profits-influenced reasonable
royalty rate.139
The court upheld the exclusion of Mars’ lost profits claim,
and affirmed the district court’s reasonable royalty
calculation.140 The court first analyzed whether lost profits
were appropriate given that Mars’ subsidiary, and not Mars
itself, sustained losses from Coinco’s infringement.141 Second,
despite finding a lost profits remedy inappropriate, the court
machine at the time of infringement.” Id. at 1123. Lextron had expended a
significant amount of labor, taking over four months to convert all of its
infringing machines to the non-infringing Type 5 machines. Id.
135. Id. (“This record shows that the Type 5 machine was not available at
the time of infringement.”).
136. Id. (“To the contrary, the record shows that Lextron designed around
the patented technology after Micro established infringement.”).
137. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
138. Id. at 1365.
139. Id. at 1372 (“First, Coinco argues that the district court erred by
awarding a reasonable royalty rate higher than the cost to Coinco of
implementing acceptable noninfringing alternatives. Second, Coinco argues
that the reasonable royalty rate could not exceed 4%, in light of Mars’s
representations to Inland Revenue. Finally, Coinco claims that the district
court erred by relying on Coinco’s incremental profit, rather than its operating
profit, to calculate a reasonable royalty.”).
140. Id. at 1374 (“[W]e affirm the district court’s summary judgment
excluding Mars’s lost profits claim.”). The reasonable royalty rate, however,
was not limited by the cost of Mars’s least expensive noninfringing alternative
and the court seems to provide that the potential availability of noninfringing
alternatives had an effect on the reasonable royalty rate. Id at 1373.
141. Id. at 1364–67.
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used Grain Processing language in justifying its reasonable
royalty calculation.142 The court seemed to establish that
Coinco’s noninfringing alternatives were available—but not
sufficiently available—to absolve Coinco of all lost profits
damages owed to Mars.143
III. ANALYSIS
A. GRAIN PROCESSING FORMALIZED CONSIDERATIONS THAT
WERE ALREADY LARGELY AT WORK FOR DETERMINING THE
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF AVAILABLE NONINFRINGING
ALTERNATIVES
The three earlier cases analyzed show that, even before
Grain Processing, courts were already positioned to deviate
from Panduit when considering entitlement to lost profits
damages affected by the availability of acceptable
noninfringing alternatives. The Grain Processing precedent
provided courts with further latitude when interpreting the
existence of an available noninfringing alternative and
entitlement to lost profits.144 Grain Processing seems to have
provided litigants with a road map for the inquiry the Federal
Circuit was previously, for the most part, inconsistently
applying. While the presence of noninfringing alternatives, as
defined under Grain Processing, precluded lost profits claims
definitively in some instances, it failed to undermine claims for
lost profits in other instances.145
After Grain Processing, the courts applied the broader
noninfringing-alternative standard to both support and deny
the absence of available noninfringing alternatives. In Siemens

142. Id. at 1373 (“There was, therefore, no available and acceptable noninfringing alternative to which Coinco could have switched at the time of the
hypothetical negotiation; there was merely the possibility that it could have
come up with one.”).
143. See id. (discussing how the district court reduced the blended royalty
rate from 11.5% to 7%).
144. See generally Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185
F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed Cir. 1999) (“The availability of substitutes invariably
will influence the market forces defining this ‘but for’ marketplace . . . .
Moreover, a substitute need not be openly on sale to exert this influence. Thus,
with proper economic proof of availability . . . an acceptable substitute not on
the market during the infringement may nonetheless become part of the lost
profits calculus and therefore limit or preclude those damages.”).
145. See supra Part II.A.
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v. Saint-Gobain, despite the existence of an arguably
acceptable noninfringing alternative on the scintillator crystal
market, the court found lost profit damages appropriate.146 In
doing so, the court found it prudent to distinguish between
“high-end” and “low-end” scintillator crystals, notwithstanding
the evident arbitrariness of such a classification, as it invoked
Grain Processing standards to bolster its analysis.147 The
court’s end-run on Panduit’s noninfringing alternative hurdle
appears little more than an exercise in legal gymnastics.
In the pre-Grain Processing example of State v. Mor-Flo, if
the Panduit standard had been adhered to strictly, the court’s
recognition of Mor-Flo’s ability to in-license (and ultimately
develop) an available and acceptable noninfringing alternative
should have barred lost profits recovery. Yet, the court
concluded: “we see no objection [to the lower court’s decision]
not to allow Mor-Flo to rely on the availability of third party
patents to mitigate damages.”148 Even after explicit
acknowledgment of the potential of a noninfringing alternative
method, the court denied its existence in determining lost
profits entitlement.149 The court seemed uninterested or
unwilling to adhere to Panduit, and to apply it consistently.
B. GRAIN PROCESSING HAS HAD A DEMONSTRABLE, BUT
PERIPHERAL, IMPACT
One might also think that prior to Grain Processing, the
four Panduit factors were sufficient and were guided by a welldeveloped body of case law ready for application.150 But it
becomes apparent, especially in the three cases prior to Grain
Processing, that application of the Panduit factors and their
effects on lost profits entitlement is strained.151 In this manner,
146. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1287–89 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
147. The arbitrariness was evidenced by overlapping sales between what
the court argues as discrete categories of PET scan machines. See id. at 1288.
148. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
149. Id. (“The district court may have overlooked that the Rheem patented
plastic foam belt might have provided an alternative way to foam insulate
heaters, but Mor-Flo presented no evidence that it could have licensed the
Rheem foam belt, and at what cost.”).
150. See Chretien, supra note 8, at 1495–96.
151. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed. Cir.
1995); State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577–81.
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Grain Processing could have served to clarify or, by acting as
an added guide post, to formalize further specific criteria that
the courts should consider and the litigants should address.
The addition of such criteria has provided courts a furtherreaching, and potentially more solid, evidentiary basis for
decisions on entitlement to certain forms of damages. Both
litigating parties now have more than adequate incentive to
provide evidence and expert testimony necessary to prove, or
disprove, the capabilities and capacities necessary to produce a
noninfringing alternative under Panduit. Some of the evident
strain with application of Panduit seems to dissipate after
additional criteria defining a noninfringing alternative were
formalized by Grain Processing.
Prior to Grain Processing, State v. Mor-Flo’s dubious
application of Panduit’s noninfringing-alternative test is
noticeable.152 Despite the court’s awareness of at least one
acceptable noninfringing alternative to State’s patented
method, the court’s probe goes no further because “Mor-Flo
presented no evidence that it could have licensed the
[alternative] foam [injection method], and at what cost.”153
Even though the court identified an available noninfringing
alternative, it required more proof than the mere existence of
such an alternative.154 However, the court did apply an
approach later formalized in Grain Processing. Its nearsummary denial of a recognized alternative turns on concerns
of the cost of and legal access to a potentially licensable

152. See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1579 (“The district court may have erred
in finding that the Rheem foam belt method likely infringed because the
patent on the foam belt was issued before and was cited as prior art in the ‘377
patent. But we need not decide. Foam insulation was the source of customer
demand and the only two available ways to do it, State’s and Rheem’s, were
patented. It therefore is probable, in light of the district court’s undisputed
finding that customers did not care about the particular method used, that
both State and Rheem would have sold their market shares of Mor-Flo’s
infringing sales.”).
153. Id. at 1581.
154. Id. at 1579 (“[T]here were other methods available—the Rheem
patented plastic foam belt, the ‘top-off’ method, and the fiberglass foam
stop . . . .”); id. at 1581 (“The district court may have overlooked that the
Rheem patented plastic foam belt might have provided an alternative way to
foam insulate heaters, but Mor-Flo presented no evidence that it could have
licensed the Rheem foam belt, and at what cost.”).
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alternative.155 The court in State v. Mor-Flo might have been
concerned with, as Grain Processing would later articulate,
Mor-Flo’s inability to “instantaneously” produce a customeracceptable substitute with “little effort.”156
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc. exemplifies a
similarly tortured application of Panduit, with no apparent
resolution.157 This might have been solved if the standard of
Grain Processing had been available to be applied. The court
allowed limited lost profits, in spite of the availability of an
acceptable noninfringing alternative.158 While the decision
turned on factual peculiarities, the court’s conclusion was that
Micron’s noninfringing alternative was actually both
noninfringing and infringing.159 The court attempted to resolve
this dilemma by distinguishing between a noninfringing
alternative that was not a “legal noninfringing alternative” for
the purpose of Pall’s entitlement to all lost profits, but that was
a “market noninfringing alternative” for the purpose of
determining the proportional amount of lost profits that Pall
was entitled to in addition to a reasonable royalty.160 Micron,
as a result, had to pay a combination of a reasonable royalty
and a portion of lost profits after Pall settled with Cuno.161
In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., it is possible that
a hypothetical application of Grain Processing could have
155. Id. at 1581 (“Mor-Flo presented no evidence that it could have licensed
the Rheem foam belt, and at what cost.”).Whether Mor-Flo could have licensed
from its competitor, Rheem, shows concern of legal access, while “at what cost”
shows concern of whether it may have been prohibitively expensive to use
Rheem’s method.
156. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341,
1356 (Fed Cir. 1999) (“American Maize could readily obtain all of the
materials needed for Process IV.”).
157. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff shall be awarded lost profits on twentyfive percent of the defendant’s infringing sales even after the settlement of two
third parties that had acceptable non-infringing alternatives).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1222–23 (“The voluntary settlement of litigation does not
retrospectively transform an accused infringing product into a ‘noninfringing
substitute.’”); id. at 1223 (“However, after Pall settled with Cuno, the district
court correctly held that Cuno’s presence in the marketplace could not be
ignored . . . .”).
160. Id. at 1222 (“The district court should have recognized the distinction
between the legal and market situation before and after the licensing of the
Cuno products.”).
161. Id. at 1223.
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entirely sidestepped the issue of whether entitlement to lost
profits would be warranted, if a complex alternative was
available. By barring a patentee’s entitlement to lost profits
damages when noninfringing alternatives are available, Grain
Processing suggests that compensation for infringement should,
to an extent, reflect the value of the patent.162 Thus, if strong
alternatives exist, the value of the patent-in-suit is
correspondingly low.163 However, as mentioned above,164 Pall
seems to suggest a compromise between patent value, and a
patentee’s entitlement to compensation in a case in which lost
profits should be recognized but reduced accordingly.165 It
seems odd that the court did not simply deny lost profits
damages altogether, rather than using the information
available to increase the award above a reasonable royalty
determined under Georgia-Pacific.166 Thus, even if Grain
Processing had been applied, the court might have effectively
distinguished its decision in such a way to avoid the

162. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341,
1353–56 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
163. James E. Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent
Characteristics 6 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-46, 2006),
available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patval.pdf (“A patent might
depreciate because of technological obsolescence (the underlying invention
becomes less valuable) or because competitors are able to ‘invent around’ the
patent.”).
164. See supra Part II.A.3.
165. See Pall, 66 F.3d at 1223 (“However, after Pall settled with Cuno, the
district court correctly held that Cuno’s presence in the marketplace could not
be ignored, and limited the award of lost profits to the share of MSI’s sales
that Pall would reasonably have made.”). However, this point could also be
explained by an analysis of Pall’s market share. Before Pall’s settlement with
Cuno, Micron deprived Pall of all of its infringing sales. After the Pall-Cuno
settlement, however, only a portion of Micron’s sales would have deprived Pall
of sales, and the remaining sales lawfully would have gone to Cuno.
166. In Georgia-Pacific, the court used the following guidelines for
computing a reasonable royalty:
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented
invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).

684

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:1

determination of whether a noninfringing alternative was
clearly available, instead of interpreting it as a matter of
degree.

C. GRAIN PROCESSING HAS APPARENTLY ENCOURAGED MORE
ROBUST PROOFS
The definitive impact of Grain Processing seems to be the
court’s enforcement of a broad, but formalized, set of additional
criteria, thus making it more difficult for patentees to
substantiate their entitlement to lost profits.167 Patentees
interested in obtaining lost profits must now proffer enough
evidence to negate the infringer’s innate capability to create,
develop, in-license, produce, and/or sell noninfringing
alternatives, even if such alternatives were not on the market
at the time of the alleged infringement.168 This, in effect, aligns
the litigants’ lost profits interest (whether proving or
disproving entitlement) with the court’s interest in requiring a
more robust evidentiary record that is essential for accurate
evaluation.169 Because of the need for greater amounts of
additional information, courts’ resources are likely to be taxed,
which may lead to more time-consuming litigation as cases
become more complex.170
Even though the application of Grain Processing may
conceivably foreclose the lost profits remedy for many
patentees, the effects of Grain Processing have been beneficial
because courts have been allowed to create more specialized
solutions. Three general categories of such solutions show the
accuracy-versus-increased-workload tradeoffs. First, a patentee
that is not entitled to lost profits is limited to a reasonable

167. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“American Maize
also had all of the necessary equipment, know-how, and experience . . . .”).
168. See id.
169. See generally Axel Schmitt-Nilson, The Unpredictability of Patent
Litigation Damage Awards: Causes and Comparative Notes, 3 INTELL. PROP.
BRIEF 53 (2012) (explaining that, in general, the intellectual property “value
inquiry [is] highly contextual and fact-specific” and that important factors in
this analysis include “the likelihood of invalidity of the patent, the size of the
market for the protected product, and the availability of substitutes for the
patented technology”).
170. See generally Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent
Cases?, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 4, 2004 at 1 (discussing the rise in “the
complexity and the importance of patent infringement cases” and how
restructuring the adjudication process may be necessary).

2014]

ACCURACY OR EFFICIENCY?

685

royalty.171 In this situation, any additional claim for lost profits
would only benefit the reasonable-royalty evaluation by further
improving the record. Second, some patentees, whether or not
they are entitled to lost profits, would erroneously be allowed,
or otherwise, denied lost profit entitlement. A more robust
record in these situations, however, supports a more rigorous
appellate process and at the same time, maintains the ability
to adjust the reasonable-royalty award, which is a valuable
safety valve. Third, patentees able to meet the Grain
Processing and Panduit standards would be entitled to lost
profits. These three specialized pathways show that the added
Grain Processing rigor errs on incentivizing more, rather than
less, information disclosure during the trial process. Thus, the
court seems to hedge the potentially more costly lost profits
award against the minimum reasonable royalty bar, while only
risking increased accuracy and workload in damages
determinations. The pre-Grain Processing cases, when
compared with those post-Grain Processing, offer ample
evidence of a trend toward more robust proofs.
In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., for example, explicit
lost profits damages were denied, and a reasonable royalty
provided the necessary safety valve to afford adequate
compensation to the patentee.172 The lost-profits-influenced
reasonable royalty rate was reduced from 11.5% to 7%, which
was still higher than the 4% rate argued during trial,173 and
was affirmed on the basis that Coinco did not have, but could
have made, an acceptable noninfringing alternative.174 Even
though lost profits per se were excluded, the court covertly
revealed strands of Grain Processing to justify its higher
reasonable royalty.175 This, along with the lower court’s forty-

171. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court.”).
172. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
173. Id. at 1373–74.
174. Id. at 1372–73.
175. Id. at 1372–73 (“First, Coinco is simply wrong to suggest that the
district court found that there were available, acceptable, non-infringing
alternatives. What the district court found was that ‘Coinco had the ability,
the resources, and the desire to design around Mars’ patents,’ that ‘it could
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six page analysis under Georgia-Pacific, provided a nearly
unassailable answer to Coinco’s question about the propriety of
a higher reasonable royalty.176 Thus, the court had a fair,
tailor-made
remedy
to
Mars’
particular
factual
circumstances.177
In cases in which the entitlement to lost profits is
questioned, such as in Zygo Corp., any additional information
submitted in hopes of achieving lost profits would contribute to
a more credible court remedy.178 The court specifically noted
the anemic evidential record in Zygo, a pre-Grain-Processing
case.179 The court opined that “while sparse” it seemed contrary
to find no available noninfringing alternative.180 Wyko’s SIRIS
could have been available as an alternative, if it had not begun
to market its new Wyko 6000 model.181 In this case, if Grain
Processing would have been available and applied, the
availability of Wyko’s SIRIS as a noninfringing alternative
might have limited Zygo’s entitlement to lost profits damages
without controversy.182 Any additional information to support

probably figure out a way to avoid infringement,’ but that the available ‘design
around was not as good as it would like.’ There was, therefore, no available
and acceptable non-infringing alternative to which Coinco could have switched
at the time of the hypothetical negotiation; there was merely the possibility
that it could have come up with one.” (citations omitted)).
176. See id. at 1364 (“[T]he district court issued a detailed oral opinion
from the bench (spanning forty-six transcript pages), analyzing the fifteen
Georgia-Pacific factors and concluding that a blended 7% royalty rate for the
two patents was reasonable.”). However, because the reasonable royalty
exceeded the expected profit from use of the patented invention, Georgia
Pacific’s “willing licensor willing licensee” negotiation rationale seems to be
compromised. Thus, it appears that the court’s decision is not so unassailable.
177. See id. at 1373 (“Coinco had the ability, the resources, and the desire
to design around Mars’ patents.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“The court’s findings should include details regarding the similarities and
differences between SIRIS, Mark IV, and Mark IVxp Interferometers.”).
179. Id.
180. Id. (“Zygo bore the burden of proof and the record evidence, while
sparse, suggests a contrary conclusion, at least as to the Mark IV
interferometer.”).
181. See id. (“The record indicates that Wyko stopped marketing the SIRIS
interferometer when it began marketing the Wyko 6000 interferometer . . . . A
lost profits award reflects the realities of sales actually lost, not the
possibilities of a hypothetical market which the infringer might have
created.”).
182. Because Wyko had been a previous manufacturer of the noninfringing alternative, there is little doubt that Grain Processing would have
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Zygo’s claim of lost profits might have also provided reason to
increase the reasonable royalty rate under Georgia-Pacific.183
Unlike Zygo Corp., which was decided before Grain
Processing, the benefits of the additional information
necessitated by the Grain Processing decision are revealed in
Micro Chem.184 The district court in Micro Chem. summarily
denied Micro’s lost profits claim by providing that a
noninfringing alternative was readily available.185 However,
this decision was vacated on appeal.186 As a result of Lextron’s
Grain Processing defense, the district court record provided a
more detailed factual record as to the availability of Lextron’s
noninfringing alternative.187 The evidence allowed for a robust
inquiry at the appellate level, even when lost profits were
denied on a motion for summary judgment rather than after
trial.188 The problem of an anemic evidential record that
plagued pre-Grain Processing cases, such as Zygo, was avoided
in Micro Chem. because of the additional Grain Processing
hurdle. While the exact contribution of this more robust record
is difficult to ascertain, Micro Chem. illustrates how Grain
Processing might have aided litigation accuracy, a necessary
component for a credible court remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has endeavored to analyze whether Federal
Circuit lost profit appeals have or would have been influenced
by the Grain Processing standard. This Note examined three
industrial product patent cases before, and three additional

limited lost profits here. See Zygo Corp., 79 F.3d at 1571 (“It is axiomatic,
however, that if a device is not available for purchase, a defendant cannot
argue that the device is an acceptable noninfringing alternative for the
purposes of avoiding a lost profits award.”).
183. See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (discussing the factors relevant for determining a reasonable
royalty). Factors five, eight, nine, and twelve are particularly relevant to a lost
profits analysis.
184. See generally Micro Chem. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1120 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (“[A] technology not on the market at the time of infringement can,
in certain circumstances, constitute an available, noninfringing alternative.”).
185. Id. at 1120.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1122 (discussing why the Type 5 machine was available
under Grain Processing).
188. See id. at 1123–26.
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cases after, Grain Processing. In analyzing these cases, this
Note showed that the standards set out in Grain Processing
have had an effect on these decisions. Grain Processing
standards appear to stand out as a formal articulation of
common-sense economic concepts that courts were already
applying even before the Grain Processing ruling. However,
Grain Processing provided additional clarity by establishing a
standardized set of criteria to evaluate available noninfringing
alternatives.189 The decision could have allowed for more
accurate decisions at the trial-court level, and subsequently for
the Federal Circuit, by supplementing the evidentiary record.
Thus, Grain Processing seems to have had subtle, but
definitive, influence on lost profits damages.

189. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“American Maize had all of the necessary equipment, knowhow, and experience to use Process IV to make Lo-Dex 10 . . . .”).

